Vol. 8, No. 3, 2015

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An extension of Young's segregation game

Michael Borchert, Mark Burek, Rick Gillman and Spencer Roach

Vol. 8 (2015), No. 3, 421–432
Abstract

In Individual strategy and social structure (2001), Young demonstrated that the stochastically stable configurations of his segregation game are precisely those that are segregated. This paper extends the work of Young to configurations involving three types of individuals. We show that the stochastically stable configurations in this more general setting are again precisely those that are segregated.

Keywords
segregation game, Schelling, markov process
Mathematical Subject Classification 2010
Primary: 60J10, 91A15, 91A22, 91C99
Milestones
Received: 1 October 2012
Revised: 21 October 2013
Accepted: 25 February 2014
Published: 5 June 2015

Communicated by Kenneth S. Berenhaut
Authors
Michael Borchert
Valparaiso University
1700 Chapel Drive
Valparaiso, IN 46383
United States
Mark Burek
Valparaiso University
1700 Chapel Drive
Valparaiso, IN 46383
United States
Rick Gillman
Valparaiso University
1700 Chapel Drive
Valparaiso, IN 46383
United States
Spencer Roach
Valparaiso University
1700 Chapel Drive
Valparaiso, IN 46383
United States