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Cost-conscious
voters in referendum elections
Kyle Golenbiewski, Jonathan K. Hodge and Lisa Moats |
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Vol. 4 (2011), No. 2, 139–155
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Abstract |
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In referendum elections, voters are frequently required to register simultaneous yes/no votes on multiple proposals. The separability problem occurs when a voter’s preferred outcome on a proposal or set of proposals depends on the known or predicted outcomes of other proposals in the election. Here we investigate cost-consciousness as a potential cause of nonseparability. We develop a mathematical model of cost-consciousness, and we show that this model induces nonseparable preferences in all but the most extreme cases. We show that when outcome costs are distinct, cost-conscious electorates always exhibit both a weak Condorcet winner and a weak Condorcet loser. Finally, we show that preferences consistent with our model of cost-consciousness are rare in randomly generated electorates. We then discuss the implications of our work and suggest directions for further research. |
Keywords
referendum elections, cost-conscious, separability,
separable preferences
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Mathematical Subject Classification 2010
Primary: 91B12
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Milestones
Received: 17 September 2010
Revised: 14 February 2011
Accepted: 16 February 2011
Published: 17 January 2012
Communicated by Kenneth S. Berenhaut
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Authors |
| Kyle Golenbiewski | |
| Department of Mathematics University of Tennessee 227 Ayres Hall 1403 Circle Drive Knoxville, TN 37996-1320 United States |
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| Jonathan K. Hodge | |
| Department of Mathematics Grand Valley State University Allendale, Michigan 49401 United States |
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| Lisa Moats | |
| Department of Mathematics University of Nebraska 203 Avery Hall PO Box 880130 Lincoln, NE 68588-0130 United States |
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| © 2011 MSP (Mathematical Sciences Publishers). |
