THE FOUR-PERSON CONSTANT-SUM GAMES;
DISCRIMINATORY SOLUTIONS ON THE MAIN DIAGONAL

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It is known that every four-person constant-sum game has discriminatory solutions. In this paper, we consider the games on the "main diagonal" which are symmetric in the first three players, and look for solutions which discriminate the fourth player, i.e., give him a constant amount. The seven types of solutions are catalogued, and necessary and sufficient conditions are found for the solution of the 3-person game to expand to a solution of the 4-person game. Finally, this paper determines the amounts which the fourth, discriminated player is allowed to receive in order that a solution of each of the seven types exist.

The four-person constant-sum games (in (0, 1)-normalization) can, as is well known, be represented by a unit cube $0 \leq v_i \leq 1$, where $v_i = 1 - v(\{i, 4\})$. We consider here games on the "main diagonal," $v_1 = v_2 = v_3 = U$. These are, of course, symmetric in $\{1, 2, 3\}$. We look for solutions which discriminate the remaining player, 4.

**DEFINITION.** Let $v$ be an $n$-person game, let $S$ be a coalition, and let $q$ be a number. Then by $\bar{v}_{s,q}$ we mean the game with player set $S$, defined by

$$\bar{v}(T) = \begin{cases} v(T) & \text{if } T \subset S, T \neq S \\ q & \text{if } T = S. \end{cases}$$

The following theorems are given without proof (see [2]):

**Theorem 1.** Let $v$ be an $n$-person game, and let $V$ be a solution which discriminates the members of $N - S$, giving them the amounts $\alpha_j$. Then the $S$-components of the elements of $V$ form a solution to the game $\bar{v}_{s,v}$, where

$$q = v(N) - \sum_{N-S} \alpha_j.$$

**Theorem 2.** Let $v$ be an $n$-person game, let $\alpha$ be an $(N - S)$-vector with $\alpha_j \geq v(\{j\})$, and let

$$q = v(N) - \sum_{N-S} \alpha_j.$$
Let $V^*$ be a solution to $\vec{v}_{s,q}$, and let $V$ be obtained from $V^*$ by adjoining the components $(\alpha_i)$ to the elements of $V^*$. Then, a necessary and sufficient condition for the set $V$ to dominate all imputations $x$, with

$$\sum_{N-S} (x_j - \alpha_j) > 0$$

is that either $v(S) \geq q$ or the core of the game $\vec{v}_{s,q}$ have no interior points. Moreover, $V$ is always internally stable.

Thanks to these theorems, the question of whether a solution of $\vec{v}_{s,q}$ expands to one of $v$, reduces to whether imputations outside of $V$, other than those satisfying (1), are dominated by $V$.

From the above, we know that a discriminatory solution to a 4-person game must have the form of a solution to a 3-person game. Now, these have been catalogued for us (see, e.g., [4]). For the games on the main diagonal, the 3-person games $\vec{v}_{s,q}$ where $S = \{1, 2, 3\}$, are symmetric, and there will be seven types of solution, types I through VII shown in Figures 1 through 7 respectively. Since the game $v$ is constant-sum, we will always have $v(\{1, 2, 3\}) \geq q$. Moreover, with only one player in $N - S$, we need only worry about imputations $x$ with $x_i > \alpha_i$. If $x_i = \alpha_i$, then either $x \in V$, or $x \notin V$ and so $(x_1, x_2, x_3) \notin V^*$. Hence there is $y \in V$ such that $(y_1, y_2, y_3)$ dominates $(x_1, x_2, x_3)$ in $(\vec{v})$ and so $y > x$ (in $v$).
Note finally that we have $\alpha_i = 1 - q$. We will use $1 - q$ throughout, rather than $\alpha_i$.

2. Description of the several types. We describe now the seven types of solution.

Type I (see Figure 1) consists of the three points $A, B, C$ (the mid-points of the inner triangle formed by the lines $x_i + x_j = U$) together with three “bargaining curves” $AD, BE, CF$, arbitrary except for the proviso that, on any one of these curves, the shares of the two players who are receiving more than the third must increase or decrease simultaneously (see [4]).

The points $A, B, C$ have the components:

(1) \[ A = (U/2, q - U, U/2, 1 - q) \]
(2) \[ B = (q - U, U/2, U/2, 1 - q) \]
(3) \[ C = (U/2, U/2, q - U, 1 - q) \]

while $D, E, F$ will be

(4) \[ D = (d_1, 0, d_3, 1 - q) \]
(5) \[ E = (0, e_2, e_3, 1 - q) \]
(6) \[ F = (f_1, f_2, 0, 1 - q) . \]

Type II (See Figure 2) consists of the straight line $AB$, plus three bargaining curves $AD, BE, CF$. The straight line is parallel to $x_3 = 0$, less than half-way up the inner triangle, whereas the point $C$ is the intersection of the lines through $A$ and $B$, parallel to $x_1 = 0$ and $x_2 = 0$, respectively. The bargaining curves are arbitrary, except for the monotonicity conditions described above.

Now $A, B, C$ are given by

(7) \[ A = (U - k, q - U, k, 1 - q) \]
(8) \[ B = (q - U, U - k, k, 1 - q) \]
(9) \[ C = (U - k, U - k, q - 2U + 2k, 1 - q) \]

where $k$ is any number satisfying

(10) \[ q - U < k < U/2 \]
(11) \[ k \geq U - q/2 . \]

Type III is very similar to type II, the sole difference lying in the fact that line $AB$ is now the edge of the inner triangle, i.e., $k = q - U$. Thus
Type IV is quite similar to type II. The difference, here, lies in the fact that the lines through \( A \) and \( B \), parallel to \( x_1 = 0 \) and \( x_2 = 0 \), intersect outside the triangle. Thus the point \( C \) disappears, as does, indeed the whole curve \( CF \). We will have

\[
A = (U - k, q - U, k, 1 - q) ,
\]

\[
B = (q - U, U - k, k, 1 - q) ,
\]

with

\[
q - U < k < U/2 ,
\]

\[
k < U - q/2 .
\]

Type V is quite similar to type IV (its relation to type IV is the same as that of III to II). The points \( A \) and \( B \) are:

\[
A = (2U - q, q - U, q - U, 1 - q) ,
\]

\[
B = (q - U, 2U - q, q - U, 1 - q) .
\]

Type VI is considerably different. It consists of the triangle \( ABC \) (see Figure 6) which is the core of the three-person game \( \bar{v} \), plus the three bargaining curves \( AD, BE, CF \). The points \( A, B, C \) have coordinates

\[
A = (q - U, 2U - q, q - U, 1 - q) ,
\]

\[
B = (2U - q, q - U, q - U, 1 - q) ,
\]

\[
C = (q - U, q - U, 2U - q, 1 - q) .
\]

Finally, type VII is the only type of solution which does not contain a bargaining curve (see Figure 7). It is the core of the three-person game, the hexagon with vertices

\[
A = (u, 0, q - U, 1 - q) ,
\]

\[
B = (0, U, q - U, 1 - q) ,
\]

\[
C = (0, q - U, U, 1 - q) ,
\]

\[
D = (U, q - U, 0, 1 - q) ,
\]

\[
E = (q - U, U, 0, 1 - q) .
\]
3. Domination of imputations. We now treat the question of consistency. Since internal consistency is trivial, we need only worry about external consistency. In this section we look for conditions that an imputation be undominated by the set \( V \). As discussed above, we need only consider imputations with \( x_i < 1 - q \).

Suppose then, that \( x_i < 1 - q \). We wish to know whether there is some \( y \in V \) with \( y > x \). Now this domination can only be through a 2-person or 3-person coalition. It cannot be through \{1, 2, 3\}, as we know that, if \( y \in V \) then \( y_i > x_i \), and so \( y_1 + y_2 + y_3 < x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \). It might be through a 2-person subcoalition of \{1, 2, 3\}, but if so, we can always add player 4 to this coalition, since the 3-person coalitions are all winning, and we have \( y_4 > x_4 \). Thus domination may be assumed to be through a 2- or 3-person coalition which includes player 4.

Suppose, then, that \( x \), with \( x_i < 1 - q \), is dominated by some \( y \in V \) through a 2-person coalition, say \{1,4\}. This means

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad y_1 > x_1 \\
(2) & \quad y_i > x_i \\
(3) & \quad y_1 + y_4 \leq v(\{1,4\}) = 1 - U.
\end{align*}
\]

Clearly, condition (2) is satisfied by all \( y \in V \), as \( y_i = 1 - q > x_i \). This means, moreover, that (3) reduces to

\[
(4) \quad y_i \leq 1 - U - (1 - q) = q - U.
\]

Thus the question of whether \( x \) is dominated through \{1,4\} by some \( y \in V \) reduces to whether there exists \( y \in V \) satisfying (1) and (4). It becomes natural to look for that \( y \in V \) which maximizes \( y_i \), subject to condition (4). Then \( x \) will be dominated through \{1,4\} by this point, if and only if \( x_i < y_i \). If \( x_i \) is greater than this constrained maximum of \( y_i \), then no \( y \in V \) can dominate \( x \) through \{1,4\}.

Looking at the several types of solution, we see that, in each type, there is some point with \( y_i = q - U \). (This is point \( B \) for types I through \( V \), point \( A \) for type \( VI \), and point \( E \) for type \( VII \).) We conclude that, for each type, a necessary and sufficient condition for \( x \) to be undominated by \( V \) through \{1,4\} is

\[
x_i \geq q - U.
\]

Consider, next, domination through \{2,4\}. The situation here is exactly the same, and the condition for nondomination is

\[
x_2 \geq q - U.
\]
We go on to domination through \{3,4\}. In this case, the symmetry of the situation is lost because there are two types (II and IV) with no point \(y\) satisfying \(y_i = q - U\). In type II, the critical point for \{3,4\} domination is \(C\), with \(y_3 = q - 2U + 2k\), while in type IV, there is no domination through \{3,4\}.

We consider, now, domination through the 3-person coalitions \{i, j, 4\}. We need worry about this domination only in case \(x\) is undominated through \{i, 4\} and \{j, 4\}.

Take, for example, the coalition \{1, 2, 4\}. We know \(y > x\) through \{1, 2, 4\} if and only if

\[
\begin{align*}
(5) & \quad y_1 > x_1, \\
(6) & \quad y_2 > x_2, \\
(7) & \quad y_4 > x_4. 
\end{align*}
\]

Condition (7) will hold automatically. Conditions (5) and (6) must hold simultaneously. But, if \(x_1 < q - U\) or \(x_2 < q - U\), \(x\) will be dominated by \{1,4\} and \{2,4\}. As we are not worried about such \(x\), we may assume \(x_i \geq q - U\) for \(i = 1, 2\). In this context, conditions (5) and (6) imply that \(y_i > q - U\) for \(i = 1, 2\). Thus we must look for points which maximize \(y_i\) and \(y_2\), subject to the constraint that both be greater than \(q - U\).

Now, it happens that, for types I, II, III, and VI, point \(F\) maximizes both \(y_1\) and \(y_2\), subject to \(y_i > q - U, y_2 > q - U\). We conclude that, for these four types, the necessary and sufficient condition for nondomination through \{1, 2, 4\}, assuming \(x\) is not dominated through \{1,4\} or \{2,4\}, is:

Either \(x_i \geq f_i\) or \(x_2 \geq f_1\).

For type IV and V solutions, the situation is slightly different. Here, there is no point which maximizes both \(y_i\) and \(y_2\); rather we find that the line segment \(AB\) maximizes the sum \(y_1 + y_2\); it satisfies \(y_1 + y_2 = q - k\) for type IV; \(y_1 + y_2 = U\) for type V. What is more, the line \(AB\) will contain all points which satisfy this equation as well as \(y_i \geq q - U\) for \(i = 1, 2\). Thus, if \(x_1 + x_2 < q - k\), with \(x_i \geq q - U, x_2 \geq q - U\), we can find some \(y\) on \(AB\) with \(y_1 > x_1, y_2 > x_2\). For type IV, the necessary and sufficient condition for nondomination through \{1, 2, 4\} (assuming nondomination through \{1,4\} and \{2,4\}) is thus

\[x_1 + x_2 \geq q - k\]

while, for type V, it is

\[x_1 + x_2 \geq U.\]
For type VII, the situation is quite simple: there is no $y \in V$ with $y_i > q - U$, $i = 1, 2$. Thus we need not worry about domination through $\{1, 2, 4\}$.

We go now to domination through $\{1, 3, 4\}$. For types I, VI, and VII, symmetry tells us that the results are similar to those for $\{1, 2, 4\}$. The critical point (for I and VI) is $D$.

For type II, lack of symmetry complicates the situation slightly, but we find that $D$ is once again critical, as it maximizes $y_i$, and $y_3$, subject to $y_i > q - U$, $y_3 > q - 2U + 2k$. This analysis is valid, with minor variations, for types III, IV, and V as well. Thus, for types I through VI, the condition

$$\text{Either } x_i \geq d_i \text{ or } x_3 \geq d_3$$

is both necessary and sufficient for $\{1, 3, 4\}$ nondomination, assuming no domination through $\{1, 4\}$ or $\{3, 4\}$. For type VII, such domination is unimportant.

For $\{2, 3, 4\}$ domination, symmetry makes the analysis exactly similar to that for $\{1, 3, 4\}$.

We conclude this section by giving a list of conditions for non-domination of $x$.

### Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>I, III, VI</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalitions ${1,4}$</td>
<td>$x_1 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_1 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_1 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_1 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_1 \geq q - U$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${2,4}$</td>
<td>$x_2 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_2 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_2 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_2 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_2 \geq q - U$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${3,4}$</td>
<td>$x_3 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_3 \geq q - 2U + 2k$</td>
<td>$x_3 \geq q - U$</td>
<td>$x_3 \geq q - U$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${1,2,4}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$x_1 \geq f_1$ or $x_2 \geq f_2$</td>
<td>$x_1 + x_2 \geq q - k$</td>
<td>$x_1 + x_2 \geq U$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${1,3,4}$</td>
<td>$x_1 \geq d_1$ or $x_3 \geq d_3$</td>
<td>$x_1 \geq d_1$ or $x_3 \geq d_3$</td>
<td>$x_1 \geq d_1$ or $x_3 \geq d_3$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${2,3,4}$</td>
<td>$x_2 \geq e_2$ or $x_3 \geq e_3$</td>
<td>$x_2 \geq e_2$ or $x_3 \geq e_3$</td>
<td>$x_2 \geq e_2$ or $x_3 \geq e_3$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. External stability. We consider now the question of whether a set $V$, of one of the types described, is really a solution. The condition for this is quite simply expressed. There must be no $x$ which satisfies all of the conditions in the table above. More precisely, the nondomination conditions must be inconsistent with the conditions $x_i \geq 0$, $\sum x_i = 1$.

Consider, thus, types I, III, and VI. The nondomination condi-
tions consist of three single conditions and three pairs of alternatives. This means that there are eight sets of six conditions each. Each of these eight sets is sufficient for nondomination, while one is necessary.

If we choose the first condition from each pair of alternatives, we have

(1) \[ x_1 \geq q - U \]
(2) \[ x_2 \geq q - U \]
(3) \[ x_3 \geq q - U \]
(4) \[ x_1 \geq f_1 \]
(5) \[ x_1 \geq d_1 \]
(6) \[ x_2 \geq e_2 \]

Now, if \( q - U \) and \( d_1 \) are both greater than \( q - U \), as is \( e_2 \). Thus the conditions (1)-(6) reduce to four.

\[ x_3 \geq q - U \]
\[ x_1 \geq f_1 \]
\[ x_1 \geq d_1 \]
\[ x_2 \geq e_2 \]

We introduce the notation

\[ g_1 = \text{Max} \{d_1, f_1\} \]
\[ g_2 = \text{Max} \{e_2, f_3\} \]
\[ g_3 = \text{Max} \{d_3, e_3\} \]

and conditions (1)-(6) reduce to

\[ x_1 \geq g_1 \]
\[ x_2 \geq e_2 \]
\[ x_3 \geq q - U \]

For \( V \) to be an imputation, this must be inconsistent with the natural constraints \( x_i \geq 0, \sum x_i = 1 \). But this happens if, and only if,

\[ g_1 + e_2 + q - U > 1 \]

In a similar manner, each of the seven other sets of conditions
will reduce to three conditions, which will be inconsistent with the natural constraints if a certain strict inequality holds. We have then:

**Theorem 3.** A necessary and sufficient condition for a set $V$, of types I, III, or VI, with $q < 1$, to be a solution, is that

(7) $g_1 + e_2 + q - U > 1$,  
(8) $d_1 + g_2 + q - U > 1$,  
(9) $g_1 + e_3 + q - U > 1$,  
(10) $g_2 + d_3 + q - U > 1$,  
(11) $f_1 + g_3 + q - U > 1$,  
(12) $f_2 + g_3 + q - U > 1$,  
(13) $d_1 + f_2 + e_3 > 1$,  
(14) $f_1 + e_2 + d_3 > 1$.

The other types of solutions can be treated similarly. For type II, we have

**Theorem 4.** A set of type II, with $q < 1$, will be a solution if and only if:

(15) $g_1 + e_2 + q - 2U + 2k > 1$,  
(16) $d_1 + g_2 + q - 2U + 2k > 1$,  
(17) $g_1 + e_3 + q - U > 1$,  
(18) $g_2 + d_3 + q - U > 1$,  
(19) $f_1 + g_3 + q - U > 1$,  
(20) $f_2 + g_3 + q - U > 1$,  
(21) $d_1 + f_2 + e_3 > 1$,  
(22) $f_1 + e_2 + d_3 > 1$.

For type IV, the situation is somewhat different. There are two pairs of alternatives, and hence four possibilities. The first possibility is

(23) $x_1 \geq q - U$,  
(24) $x_2 \geq q - U$,  

Now, $d_1 \geq q - U$ and $e_2 \geq q - U$. Moreover, we know that $q - 2U + 2k < 0$, as otherwise the solution would be of type II (i.e., the point $C$ would be an imputation). But this means that $d_1 + e_2 \geq q - 2k$, and as $k > 0$, $d_1 + e_2 \geq q - k$. The five conditions (23)-(27) thus reduce to two:

\[
\begin{align*}
    x_1 &\geq d_1 \\
    x_2 &\geq e_2.
\end{align*}
\]

and the condition for inconsistency is $d_1 + e_2 > 1$. We treat the other conditions similarly, to obtain

**Theorem 5.** A set of type IV, with $q < 1$, will be a solution if and only if

\[
\begin{align*}
    d_1 + e_2 &> 1, \\
    d_1 + e_3 + q - U &> 1, \\
    e_2 + d_3 + q - U &> 1, \\
    g_3 + q - k &> 1.
\end{align*}
\]

A somewhat similar treatment for type V gives us

**Theorem 6.** A set of type V, with $q < 1$, will be a solution if and only if

\[
\begin{align*}
    d_1 + e_2 + q - U &> 1, \\
    d_1 + e_3 + q - U &> 1, \\
    e_2 + d_3 + q - U &> 1, \\
    g_3 + U &> 1.
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, for type VII, there are no alternatives, and so

**Theorem 7.** A set of type VII, will be a solution if and only if

\[
q - U > 1/3.
\]
5. Existence of solutions. We have, in §4, given conditions for a set \( V \), of the several types discussed, to be a solution. We now consider the more difficult problem of deciding the values of \( U \) and \( q \) for which such solutions exist. This will mean determining whether the conditions (4.7)-(4.14), (4.15)-(4.22), (4.28)-(4.31), (4.32)-(4.35), or (4.36) will be consistent with the remaining constraints of the problems.

We note first of all that, for the first six types of solution, a necessary condition is

\[
2q - U > 1.
\]

In effect, this is due to the fact that, in any case,

\[
d_1 + d_3 = e_2 + e_3 = f_1 + f_2 = q.
\]

Now, looking at constraints (4.7)-(4.14) we see that (5.1) is implied, whatever \( g_1, g_2, \) and \( g_3 \) may be. Thus, if we have \( g_1 = d_1, g_2 = f_2, g_3 = e_3 \), we need only to add (4.7), (4.10) and (4.11), obtaining \( 6q - 3U > 3 \). If, on the other hand, we should have \( g_1 = d_1, g_2 = e_2, g_3 = d_3 \), we would add (4.8), (4.9), (4.11) and (4.12) to obtain \( 8q - 4U > 4 \).

This disposes of types I, III, and VI, for all other cases reduce to one of these, by symmetry.

For type II, the same holds if we substitute the inequality \( k < U/2 \) in (4.15) and (4.16). For type IV, addition of (4.29) and (4.30) gives \( 4q - 2U > 2 \). Finally, for type V, addition of (4.33) and (4.34) gives the same result.

Condition (5.1) is thus necessary for types I through VI. We look, however, for necessary and sufficient conditions.

Consider type I. We know that this can only exist if

\[
2q \geq 3U.
\]

In addition to constraints (5.2), the points \( D, E, F \) must satisfy

\[
d_1, d_3, e_2, e_3, f_1, f_2 \geq U/2
\]

and it is clear that

\[
d_1 = d_3 = e_2 = e_3 = f_1 = f_2 = q/2
\]

will satisfy all the constraints (4.7)-(4.15), (5.2) and (5.4) whenever \( q \geq U \). But we must have \( q \geq U \) if (5.1) holds. Thus

**Theorem 8.** A game on the main diagonal will have a solution to type I, with \( q < 1 \), if and only if

\[
1/2 < U < 1.
\]
For such \( U \), it will have such a solution for \( q \) satisfying

\[
U + 1 < 2q \leq 3U.
\]

**Proof.** Condition (6) has been proved. Moreover, it is easy to see that (5) is necessary and sufficient for (6) to be feasible.

Consider next type II. We know that (3) must hold, as well as (2.10)-(2.11). Now, \( D, E, F \) must satisfy (2), and also

\[
d_i, e_i, f_i, f_z \geq U - k
\]

(7)

\[
d_3, e_3 \geq k
\]

(8)

and we see that, if we choose \( k = U/2 - \varepsilon \) (where \( \varepsilon \) is less than \( 2U - q - 1 \)) the vector

\[
d_1 = d_3 = e_2 = e_3 = f_1 = f_2 = q/2
\]

will satisfy constraints (4.15)-(4.22), (2), (7) and (8) whenever (1) and (3) hold. Thus

**Theorem 9.** A game on the main diagonal will have a solution of type II, with \( q < 1 \), if and only if

\[
1/2 < U < 1.
\]

For such \( U \), it will have such a solution if \( q \) satisfies

\[
U + 1 < 2q \leq 3U.
\]

**Proof.** Same as for Theorem 8.

We go on to type III. We know, first of all, that condition (3) is necessary. Moreover, we must have \( 3q - 4U \geq 0 \), as otherwise \( C \) will be outside the simplex of imputations, giving rise to a type V solution. Thus

\[
2q/3 \leq U \leq 3q/4.
\]

Now \( D, E, F \) must satisfy (2), and also

\[
d_i, e_i, f_i, f_z \geq 2U - q.
\]

(12)

\[
d_3, e_3 \geq q - U.
\]

(13)

We see that the vector

\[
d_1 = e_2 = (3U - q)/2
\]

\[
d_3 = e_3 = (3q - 3U)/2
\]

\[
f_1 = f_2 = q/2
\]

will satisfy all the constraints whenever (1) and (11) hold. Thus
Theorem 10. A game on the main diagonal will have a solution of type III, with \( q < 1 \), if and only if

\[
1/2 < U < 3/4.
\]

For such \( U \) it will have such a solution for \( q \) satisfying

\[
4U/3 \leq q \leq 3U/2
\]

\[
2q > U + 1.
\]

Consider next type IV. Once again, we know that we must have condition (3). However, \( k \) must satisfy conditions (2.17)-(2.18), which together imply the much stronger constraint:

\[
3q < 4U.
\]

Finally, \( D \) and \( E \) must satisfy (2), and also

\[
d_1, e_2 \geq U - k
\]

\[
d_3, e_3 \geq k.
\]

Suppose now \( U > 4g/5 \). Then the vector

\[
k = q - U + \varepsilon
\]

\[
d_1 = e_2 = U - k
\]

\[
d_3 = e_3 = q - U + k
\]

will satisfy constraints (4.28)-(4.31), as well as (2), (18) and (19), whenever (1) holds.

Suppose, on the other hand, \( U \leq 4g/5 \). Then, suppose \( g_3 = d_3 \) (analogous results will hold if we suppose \( g_3 = e_3 \)). Adding constraints (4.28), (4.29) and twice (4.31), we find

\[
6q - U - 2k > 4
\]

which together with \( k > q - U \) gives us

\[
q + U/4 > 1.
\]

Now the vector

\[
k = q - U + \varepsilon
\]

\[
d_1 = q - U/2
\]

\[
d_3 = U/2
\]

\[
e_2 = 3U/4
\]

\[
e_3 = q - 3U/4
\]
is easily seen to satisfy the constraints, whenever (20) holds and $3q/4 \leq U \leq 4q/5$.

Considering the two possibilities, we see that, for $U > 4q/5$, we will have $2q - U > 1$ only if $U > 2/3$, whereas, for $U > 3q/4$, we can have $q + U/4 > 1$ whenever $U > 12/19$. Thus

**Theorem 11.** A game on the main diagonal will have a solution of type IV, with $q < 1$, if and only if

\[(21) \quad \frac{12}{19} < U < 1.\]

For $12/19 < U \leq 2/3$, it will have such solutions for $q$ satisfying

\[(22) \quad 1 - \frac{U}{4} < q < \frac{4U}{3},\]

whereas, for $2/3 < U \leq 1$, it will have such solutions for

\[(23) \quad \frac{U + 1}{2} < q < \frac{4U}{3}.\]

We go on to type V. As for type IV, (17) must hold. The points $D$ and $E$ must satisfy (2), and also

\[(24) \quad d_1, e_2 \geq 2U - q\]

\[(25) \quad d_3, e_3 \geq q - U.\]

It is clear that the vector

\[d_1 = e_2 = 2U - q\]

\[d_3 = e_3 = 2q - 2U\]

will satisfy all the constraints (4.7)-(4.14), (2), (24) and (25), whenever (1) and (17) hold. Thus

**Theorem 12.** A game on the main diagonal will have a solution of type V, with $q < 1$, if and only if

\[(26) \quad \frac{3}{5} < U < 1.\]

It will have such solutions for $q$ satisfying

\[(27) \quad \frac{4U}{3} > q > \frac{U + 1}{2}.\]

We go on to type VI. We know these solutions can exist only if $q/2 \leq U \leq 2q/3$. The constraints on $D, E, F$ here are (2) and
(28) \[ d_1, d_3, e_2, e_3, f_1, f_2 \geq q - U. \]

It is not difficult to see that the vector
\[ d_1 = d_3 = e_2 = e_3 = f_1 = f_2 = q/2 \]
will satisfy constraints (4.7)-(4.14), (2) and (28) whenever (1) holds and \( q/2 \leq U \leq 2q/3 \). Thus we find

**Theorem 13.** A game on the main diagonal will have a solution of type VI, with \( q < 1 \), for

(29) \[ 1/3 < U < 2/3. \]

It will have such a solution for \( q \) satisfying

(30) \[ \frac{3}{2} U \leq q \leq 2U, \]

(31) \[ q > \frac{1 + U}{2}. \]

We go finally to type VII. Here, the situation is extremely simple, as there are no variables to worry about. We know we must have \( q \geq 2U \). From this and (4.36), we have

**Theorem 14.** A game on the main diagonal will have a solution of type VII, with \( q < 1 \), if and only if

(32) \[ 0 \leq U < 1/2. \]

For such \( U \), solutions will exist for \( q \) satisfying

(33) \[ q > U + 1/3 \]

(34) \[ q \geq 2U. \]

6. Conclusion. This terminates, more or less, the study of discriminatory solutions. We find, however, that many assumptions have been made throughout. One is that \( q < 1 \), the other, that \( U < q \). We clear this up by pointing out that, for \( U \geq q \), there can be solutions, if any, only of types I, IV, and V. If of type I, the solution would consist only of the three points:

\[ A = (q/2, 0, q/2, 1 - q) \]
\[ B = (0, q/2, q/2, 1 - q) \]
\[ C = (q/2, q/2, 0, 1 - q). \]

For \( q < 1 \), it is clear that \((1/2, 1/2, 0, 0)\) is undominated by these. In
effect, such domination could only be through \{3,4\} by \(A\) or \(B\). But

\[q/2 + 1 - q > 1 - q \geq 1 - U = v([3,4])\]

and so there is no domination.

As for a solution of types IV or V, this would consist only of the line \(AB\), joining.

\[A = (q - k, 0, k, 1 - q)\]

and

\[B = (0, q - k, k, 1 - q)\]

and again \(((1 - k)/2, (1 - k)/2, k, 0)\) is undominated as, for \(i = 1, 2, 3\), we have \(1 - q \geq v([i, 4])\).

We consider finally the case of \(q = 1\). In this case, the problem has been solved (see, e.g., [4]). We will have solutions of the several types for:

\[\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad 2/3 \leq U \leq 1 \quad \text{(type I)} \\
(2) & \quad 2/3 \leq U \leq 1 \quad \text{(type II)} \\
(3) & \quad 2/3 \leq U \leq 3/4 \quad \text{(type III)} \\
(4) & \quad 3/4 \leq U \leq 1 \quad \text{(type IV)} \\
(5) & \quad 3/4 \leq U \leq 1 \quad \text{(type V)}
\end{align*}\]
\begin{align*}
(6) & \quad 1/2 \leq U \leq 2/3 \quad \text{(type VI)} \\
(7) & \quad 0 \leq U \leq 1/2 \quad \text{(type VII)}.
\end{align*}

We conclude with Figure 8, which shows graphically the types of discriminatory solutions possible for all pairs \((q, U)\) from 0 to 1.

\section*{Bibliography}


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